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How do observers internally represent the external envi-
ronment? The visual system can explicitly encode only a 
fraction of what is visible in each glance, and even then, 
the resultant internal representations are far from faithful 
to the true state of the external environment. Yet some-
how, people get the gist and perceive the world as stable 
and complete. How does the brain achieve this illusion 
of perceived order amid continuous sensory chaos?
The understanding of how the brain represents 
objects has grown exponentially since the monumental 
discovery of visual neurons tuned to physical stimulus 
properties (Hubel & Wiesel, 1959). Researchers have 
classified massive interconnected cortical networks with 
unique global response patterns for different types of 
objects (Haxby et al., 2001), decoded details of objects 
in visual short-term memory (VSTM) from cortical activ-
ity (Harrison & Tong, 2009), and even “read out” neural 
patterns that indicate what object a person sees before 
the person is explicitly aware of the object (Thorpe, Fize, 
& Marlot, 1996). Recent landmark advances in computa-
tional power have allowed for the design of systems that 
can recreate the activity of networks of billions of neu-
rons in response to visual stimuli on the basis of general 
principles abstracted from the visual system’s structure 
and function (e.g., Itti & Koch, 2001; Serre, Oliva, & 
Poggio, 2007). Such powerful algorithms can take all the 
information available in an image as input in parallel. 
However, the brain is not a computer. There is over-
whelming evidence that it cannot internally reproduce a 
one-to-one mapping of the external environment. For 
example, people are often “blind” to salient changes 
right in front of them (e.g., Simons & Chabris, 1999). In 
fact, it is widely accepted that attention is necessary to 
see change (Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997), yet peo-
ple can attend only a few objects at once (Luck & Vogel, 
1997). Therefore, vision researchers across science and 
technology are challenged to bridge the growing gap 
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between overwhelming progress in understanding how 
humans internally represent objects and the underdevel-
oped knowledge of how the brain uses the remaining 
majority of information that is not explicitly encoded.
Instead of ignoring, suppressing, or discarding the 
mass of information that escapes focused attention, a 
number of recent findings converge to suggest that the 
visual system circumvents capacity limitations, in part by 
relying on a default set of heuristics that are based on 
regularities in the external environment. These heuristics 
guide the formation of initial perceptual chunks that 
pragmatically constrain further processing. Toward 
advancing our understanding of how the limited-capacity 
visual system allows for such amazing perceptual capa-
bilities, the present investigation examined how several 
such constraints determine what observers remember.
An ever-growing body of research suggests that per-
ceptual averaging, an efficient means of statistically com-
pressing redundant information in sets of objects, is a 
promising strategy for coping with the visual system’s 
limited representational capacity (Alvarez, 2011; Ariely, 
2001). For example, average properties are represented 
even when individual items are not (e.g., size; Corbett & 
Oriet, 2011) and are encoded as basic visual dimensions 
(Corbett, Wurnitsch, Schwartz, & Whitney, 2012); repre-
sentations of average properties underlie the ability to 
maintain stable perception while interacting with the 
external environment (Corbett & Melcher, 2014a, 2014b; 
Corbett & Song, 2014). The efficiency of summarizing 
average properties of sets of similar objects without 
encoding redundant details bears many similarities to 
previous gestalt proposals that perception is parsimoni-
ously organized as a function of recurrent order in the 
physical world (Wertheimer, 1925/1938). There is mount-
ing evidence that grouping and averaging are part of a 
broader set of strategies the human visual system has 
developed to alleviate representational capacity limita-
tions. For example, recent findings suggest that gestalt 
grouping facilitates perceptual averaging (Im & Chong, 
2014) and reduces the neural resources needed to main-
tain sets of items in VSTM (Peterson, Gözenman, 
Arciniega, & Berryhill, 2015; Xu & Chun, 2007). These 
findings raise the intriguing and testable hypothesis that 
the visual system efficiently represents environmental 
regularities by using gestalt heuristics to group and statis-
tically compress information.
The idea that information about sets of objects can be 
remembered en masse stands in sharp contrast to tradi-
tional slot models of memory (e.g., Cowan, 2001; Pashler, 
1988), which posit a finite VSTM capacity of about four 
items. However, a number of recent findings contest this 
strict-capacity view and suggest that observers rely on 
higher-order structure to remember summary repre-
sentations of sets of multiple objects (e.g., Brady & 
Tenenbaum, 2013). Therefore, the present investigation 
of whether gestalt grouping facilitates the manner in 
which observers rely on statistical representations will 
help to further elucidate the nature of VSTM capacity.
Measuring the error in observers’ recollections of indi-
vidual object properties allows for an assessment of the 
format of structured memory representations. For exam-
ple, Lew and Vul (2015) reported that observers’ memo-
ries of the locations of objects arranged in different 
spatial clusters were biased toward the respective clus-
ters’ centers. Participants studied displays of objects 
arranged in different spatial groupings for several sec-
onds. When they were shown a subsequent display with 
the objects at the bottom of the screen and asked to place 
the objects in their corresponding locations from the pre-
vious study display, the magnitude of the observers’ recall 
errors for objects within the same clusters were more 
similar than would be expected if the objects’ locations 
were independently coded. Brady and Alvarez (2011) 
reported a similar bias for the remembered sizes of indi-
vidual circles. Observers were shown displays of red, 
blue, and green circles of various sizes, followed by a 
single black test circle. When observers were asked to 
adjust the size of the test circle to match the size of the 
circle that had occupied the same location in the previ-
ous display, they tended to make larger adjustments 
when other circles of the same color (e.g., blue) were 
large than when other circles of the same color (e.g., red) 
were small.
The present investigation used a hybrid of Lew and 
Vul’s (2015) error-similarity paradigm and Brady and 
Alvarez’s (2011) adjustment task to quantify how gestalt 
grouping affects the manner in which information is 
averaged and remembered. Specifically, I measured the 
error in observers’ adjustments of the remembered sizes 
of individual circles in two different mean-size sets that 
were presented for two different durations (500 ms or 
5  s) and defined by four different gestalt principles of 
grouping (similarity, proximity, connectedness, and com-
mon region). To the extent that grouping facilitates aver-
aging, the magnitudes of participants’ errors would be 
expected to be more correlated for circles in the same 
gestalt-defined sets, and participants should recall indi-
vidual circles’ sizes with bias toward respective set means. 
To the extent that grouping and averaging increase VSTM 
efficiency, this mean-size bias would be expected to min-
imize the overall error in individual estimates.
Method
Participants
Thirty-three students from Bilkent University (mean age = 
21.61 years, age range = 19–29; 22 female), all with normal 
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or corrected-to-normal vision, voluntarily participated in 
the main experiment either for course credit or for money. 
A minimum sample size of 30 participants was chosen a 
priori on the basis of the sample sizes (ranging from 16 to 
35 participants) used in the previous studies by Lew and 
Vul (2015) and Brady and Alvarez (2011). All procedures 
and protocols were in accordance with the guidelines of 
Bilkent University’s ethical review board.
Task
On each trial, participants viewed a study display of 16 
circles of different sizes followed by a test display of six 
circles of the same size. Their task was to use the com-
puter mouse to select a circle in the test display. They 
then used the “↑” and “↓” keys on the computer key-
board to increase or decrease the size of the test circle 
until it matched the remembered size of the circle in the 
corresponding location in the study display. They per-
formed this task for each of the six text circles, one after 
another.
Apparatus
A Dell PC presented the stimuli against a gray (midway 
between black and white) background on a 41- × 23-cm 
Samsung LCD monitor with a 60-Hz refresh rate and a 
resolution of 1,366 × 768 pixels. Participants were seated 
with their heads centered approximately 57 cm from the 
middle of the screen, such that 1° of visual angle corre-
sponded to approximately 34 pixels. MATLAB (Version 
2015a; The MathWorks, Natick, MA) and Psychophysics 
Toolbox (Version 3; Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) controlled 
all the presentation, timing, and response functions.
Stimuli
Study displays. Each study display was composed of 
two sets of 8 circles of various sizes, for a total of 16 cir-
cles per study display. The small-mean-size set contained 
8 circles ranging in diameter from 0.5° to 1.2° in 0.1° 
steps (mean size = 0.85° of visual angle); the large-mean-
size set contained 8 circles ranging in diameter from 0.9° 
to 1.6° in 0.1° steps (mean size = 1.25° of visual angle). 
Note that because these ranges overlapped, 4 of the cir-
cles in each set had a counterpart of the same size in the 
other set. The 16 circles were positioned pseudoran-
domly inside an imaginary 4 × 4 square grid, subtending 
approximately 12° of visual angle, in the center of the 
screen. The positions of the individual circles in each set 
were randomized on every trial within the gestalt group-
ing constraints (see the next four sections), such that no 
location consistently contained a circle that was larger or 
smaller than any other circle in the set; only the mean 
sizes of the sets and the individual sizes of the circles in 
each set remained constant over the course of the experi-
ment. On each trial, the small-mean-size and large- 
mean-sets were grouped according to one of four gestalt 
heuristics: similarity, proximity, connectedness, or com-
mon region (Fig. 1):
•• Similarity. When the circles were grouped by simi-
larity, the sets were arranged by alternating the 
light-gray and dark-gray color of neighboring cir-
cles. The circles in the top leftmost and bottom 
rightmost positions were always the same color 
(i.e., in the same set). The small-mean-size set was 
randomly assigned either the dark-gray or the 
light-gray color (corresponding to 75% and 25% of 
the monitor’s white-to-black contrast range, respec-
tively) on each trial, and the large-mean-size set 
was assigned the opposite color. In the example 
shown in Figure 1 (top row, left-most panel), the 
small-mean-size set is presented in dark gray.
•• Proximity. When the circles were grouped accord-
ing to proximity, the sets were arranged in either 
rows or columns. The small-mean-size set was ran-
domly assigned to the top or bottom of the screen 
(for rows) or to the left or right side of the screen 
(for columns), and the large-mean-size set was 
assigned to the opposite location. Each set was 
shifted away from the opposite set, so that the dis-
tance between the innermost rows or columns 
(from circle center to circle center) was 3.8°. The 
centers of the circles in each set were separated 
from each other by 3° horizontally and 3° verti-
cally. All of the circles were randomly assigned one 
color (black or white) on each trial. In the example 
shown in Figure 1 (top row, second from left), the 
circles are grouped in columns, and the small-
mean-size set is presented on the left.
•• Connectedness. When the sets were grouped by the 
gestalt heuristic of connectedness, a 0.05° wide line 
was extended from circle to circle to form two 
roughly rectangular arrangements on either the top 
and bottom (rows) or the left and right sides (col-
umns) of the screen. The small-mean-size set was 
randomly assigned to the top or bottom of the screen 
(for rows) or to the left or right side of the screen 
(for columns), and the large-mean-size set was 
assigned to the opposite location. All of the circles 
and the lines connecting them were randomly 
assigned one color (black or white) on each trial. In 
the example shown in Figure 1 (top row, second 
from right), the circles are grouped in rows, and the 
small-mean-size set is presented on the bottom.
•• Common region. When the circles were grouped 
according to the gestalt heuristic of common 
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region, the sets were arranged in either rows or 
columns. The small-mean-size set was randomly 
assigned to the top or bottom of the screen (for 
rows) or to the left or right side of the screen (for 
columns), and the large-mean-size set was assigned 
to the opposite location. A dark-gray rectangle 
(56% of the monitor’s white-to-black contrast) was 
randomly assigned to one of the sets of circles, and 
a light-gray rectangle (44% of the monitor’s white-
to-black contrast) was assigned to the other set. 
Each rectangle fully enclosed the circles of the set 
to which it was assigned. The imaginary line at 
which the two rectangles met was centered on the 
screen, either vertically (for rows) or horizontally 
(for columns). Each rectangle was 12° wide × 6° 
tall (for rows) or 6° wide × 12° tall (for columns). 
All of the circles were randomly assigned one color 
(black or white) on each trial. In the example 
shown in Figure 1 (top row, rightmost panel), the 
circles are grouped in columns, and the light-gray 
rectangle on the left encloses the small-mean-size 
set.
Test displays. Each test display was composed of six 
circles of the same size; on each trial, the circles’ size was 
randomly selected to correspond to the size of one of 
the 16 study circles. The locations of the six circles were 
randomly selected on each trial from among the 16 loca-
tions in the previous study display, three from each 
gestalt-defined set (Fig. 1). Each test circle was centered 
relative to the corresponding circle in the previous study 
display. For circles grouped by proximity, connectedness, 
and common region, test circles were the same color as 
in the previous study display. For circles grouped by sim-
ilarity, test circles were presented as 2-pixel wide black 
outlines filled with the same medium-gray color as the 
global screen background.1 The dark- and light-gray col-
ors of the two groups of circles in the similarity condi-
tions, the distance between the two groups in the 
proximity condition, the width of the lines connecting 
circles within each group in the connectedness condi-
tion, and the dark- and light-gray colors of the rectangles 
surrounding each group of circles in the common-region 
condition were selected on the basis of the results of 
earlier pilot studies that had tested a range of gestalt 
strengths.
Procedure
Participants initiated each trial by pressing the space bar. 
Immediately afterward, the study display of 16 circles 
was presented for either 500 ms or 5 s, followed by the 
test display of 6 circles, which remained on the screen 
until participants had finished adjusting all the test 
ProximitySimilarity Connectedness Common Region
Study Displays










“Adjust each test circle to match the size of the corresponding circle in the study display”
Fig. 1. Experimental stimuli and procedure. Study displays (top row) contained two sets of eight circles of various sizes. One set had a small 
mean circle size, and the other had a large mean circle size. The sets appeared in one of four gestalt groupings (similarity, proximity, connected-
ness, and common region) and were displayed for 500 ms or 5 s. For details, see the Study Displays section. After viewing the study displays, 
the participants viewed test displays (bottom row) in which they adjusted six test circles of the same size (three from each gestalt-defined group) 
to match their memory of the sizes of the circles in those locations in the preceding study displays. For details, see the Test Displays section. In 
the leftmost panel of the bottom row, capital letters S and L refer to whether a test circle belongs to the small- or large-mean-size set; subscript 
lower-case letters s, m, and l refer to the relative small, medium, and large sizes of the circles within each set when they appeared in the preced-
ing study display. The dashed circle in the top left study display indicates the actual size of an individual test circle, and the dashed circle in the 
bottom left test display indicates the corresponding circle to be adjusted by the participant. The magnitude of error for the individual circle was 
calculated as the circle’s adjusted size minus its actual size.
16 Corbett
circles. A 0.4° red circle was presented simultaneously in 
a random position along with the six circles in the test 
display on each trial. Participants were instructed to use 
the mouse to move this red circle over the test circle they 
wished to adjust. When participants clicked the red 
mouse circle on any location inside a particular circle, the 
red circle disappeared and a 0.1° green circle appeared 
in the center of the given circle to indicate that it had 
been selected for adjustment. Participants then used the 
“↑” and “↓” keys on the computer keyboard to increase 
or decrease the size of the selected circle in steps of 2 
pixels. When they had adjusted a given circle to match 
the remembered size of the corresponding circle in the 
previous study display, participants pressed the “Enter” 
key to continue to the next circle. The red circle reap-
peared at a random location within the display, and the 
participants selected a new circle to adjust.
Participants were informed that each circle could be 
adjusted only once and that they had to adjust every test 
circle before they would be able to proceed to the next 
trial. They were also instructed to respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible on each trial. Unbeknownst to par-
ticipants, they were required to adjust each circle with a 
minimum of three presses of the arrow keys; this require-
ment was intended to guard against a tendency, observed 
in an earlier pilot study, for some participants to select 
individual circles and press enter without performing the 
required size adjustments. If participants did not adjust a 
given test circle to satisfy this criterion, they saw a mes-
sage reading “Please adjust the circle more carefully” in 
the center of the display until the participant pressed one 
of the two arrow keys to continue adjusting the selected 
circle. If participants received this warning 10 times in a 
given block, the experimental session was terminated 
and their data were excluded from analysis.
Observers completed one practice block of 5 trials 
(excluded from further analysis), followed by four blocks 
of 32 trials each in the main experiment. Each block in 
the main experiment contained two repetitions of the 16 
possible combinations of the four gestalt conditions (sim-
ilarity, proximity, connectedness, and common region), 
the two duration conditions (500 ms and 5 s), and the 
two possible arrangements (rows or columns in the prox-
imity, connectedness, and common-region conditions, or 
starting with a dark-gray circle or a light-gray circle in the 
top leftmost position in the similarity condition), pre-
sented in pseudorandom order, for a total of 128 trials 
per participant. Trials were collapsed across the two 
types of arrangements, for a total of 16 trials per point in 
each of the eight possible combinations of the gestalt and 
duration conditions of interest in three main analyses: 
error similarity, mean-size bias, and VSTM efficiency.
Participants were shown written illustrated instruc-
tions on the computer screen in either English or Turkish 
at the beginning of the practice block and each experi-
mental block, and all text displayed over the course of 
the experiment was also presented in the participant’s 
language of choice (Turkish or English). The experi-
menter ensured that each participant fully understood 
the task before beginning the main experimental blocks. 
Six participants (not included in the earlier description of 
participants) were not able to complete the main experi-
ment because they were warned 10 times in a single 
block to carefully adjust the test circles (these partici-
pants were stopped after their third attempt at the 
practice block). For participants who completed the 
experiment, the entire session lasted between 1 and 1.5 
hours. All of these participants were given a short (5–10 




To compare the precision of the size adjustments within 
and between the two gestalt-defined mean-size groups 
in each display, I calculated participants’ adjustment 
errors for each of the six test circles on each trial relative 
to the actual sizes of the corresponding circles in the 
preceding study display (adjusted size minus actual size). 
Specifically, for data from each trial, within each of the 
two gestalt-defined groups of circles, the actual sizes of 
the three test circles were ordered from smallest to larg-
est (Fig. 1, bottom row, leftmost panel), and the corre-
sponding adjustment errors were calculated. For the eight 
combinations of the gestalt and duration conditions, each 
subject’s average error similarities—that is, the average 
sample Pearson correlations (r) between errors—for cir-
cles within the same gestalt-defined small- or large-mean-
size groups and between different gestalt-defined groups2 
were calculated from the individual trial errors (i) for a 
given pair of the six test sizes (x,y) using the following 
formula:
error similarity = =r























where x  and y  are the respective sample mean errors 




Error similarity was greater for circles within the same 
gestalt-defined groups than for circles within different 
gestalt-defined groups. A 2 (gestalt-defined group: same, 
different) × 4 (gestalt condition: similarity, proximity, con-
nectedness, common region) × 2 (duration condition: 
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500 ms, 5 s) repeated measures within-subjects omnibus 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on error similarities pro-
vided initial support for this conclusion, revealing signifi-
cant main effects of gestalt-defined group and gestalt 
condition (both ps < .001). It was surprising that the main 
effect of duration condition (500 ms, 5 s) was not signifi-
cant, suggesting that size was encoded relative to gestalt-
defined group regardless of whether participants viewed 
displays very briefly (i.e., for half a second) or much lon-
ger (i.e., for 5 s). No significant two- or three-way interac-
tions were observed. For the full results of this omnibus 
ANOVA, see Table S1a in the Supplemental Material avail-
able online.
The main series of eight planned comparisons (α = 
.05; p = .03, adjusted for false-discovery rate, or FDR) 
examined participants’ average error similarities within 
the same gestalt-defined groups relative to between dif-
ferent gestalt-defined groups. The results revealed signifi-
cantly greater correlations within the same gestalt-defined 
groups than across different gestalt-defined groups for 
each combination of the gestalt and duration conditions, 
except for the 500-ms connectedness condition (Fig. 2a; 
for the full results of the eight planned comparisons, see 
Table S1b in the Supplemental Material). Importantly, 
follow-up one-sample t tests (α = .05; p = .02, FDR-
adjusted) confirmed that participants’ error similarities for 
circles within the same groups were significantly corre-
lated (i.e., the coefficient was greater than 0), supporting 
the proposal that individual circles’ sizes were recalled 
relative to their respective gestalt-defined groups in all 
combinations of the gestalt and duration conditions. 
However, this was the case for only half of the corre-
sponding error similarities between circles in different 
groups, such that there were no significant differences for 
the similarity or connectedness conditions at either dura-
tion (for the full results of both sets of one-sample t tests, 
see Table S1c in the Supplemental Material).
Mean-size bias
As outlined in the introduction, Brady and Alvarez (2011) 
found that the same circle was remembered as smaller or 
larger depending on whether other circles in the same 
color in the preceding display were small or large, respec-
tively. To directly examine whether such bias toward the 
gestalt-defined-group mean size was an underlying influ-
ence on observers’ recollections of individual objects’ 
sizes, I compared their adjustments of physically identical 
test circles when presented in the small-mean-size gestalt-
defined group and when presented in the large-mean-
size gestalt-defined group. Recall that four of the circles 
in each mean-size set had a counterpart of the same size 
(i.e., 0.9°, 1.0°, 1.1°, and 1.2°) in the other set. Therefore, 
although the circles tested from each small- and 
large-mean-size gestalt-defined group were randomly 
determined on every trial, each of these four sizes had an 
equal probability (~12.5% of trials) of appearing as a test 
circle in either group in each combination of the gestalt 
and duration conditions.
An initial 2 (gestalt-defined group: small mean size, 
large mean size) × 4 (gestalt condition: similarity, proxim-
ity, connectedness, common region) × 2 (duration condi-
tion: 500 ms, 5 s) repeated measures within-subjects 
omnibus ANOVA was conducted to investigate whether 
participants recalled identically sized test circles as a 
function of their membership in a small-mean-size or 
large-mean-size gestalt-defined group. This analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of mean size of the 
gestalt-defined group, a significant main effect of gestalt 
condition, a significant interaction between mean size of 
the gestalt-defined group and gestalt condition, and a 
significant three-way interaction (all ps < .05; for full 
ANOVA results, see Table S2a in the Supplemental 
Material).
The main series of eight planned comparisons (α = 
.05; p = .002, FDR-adjusted) confirmed significant differ-
ences between the adjusted sizes of identical test circles 
for the 500-ms proximity condition and for the 5-s prox-
imity, connectedness, and common-region conditions. 
Participants’ adjustments of identically sized test circles 
were larger when the test circles were presented as part 
of large-mean-size gestalt-defined groups than when 
they were presented within small-mean-size gestalt-
defined groups (Fig. 2b; Table S2b in the Supplemental 
Material available online presents the full results of the 
eight planned comparisons).
VSTM efficiency
Comparing the magnitudes of errors in participants’ 
adjustments of the individual circles relative to the gestalt-
defined-group mean size with their errors relative to the 
corresponding actual sizes in the study display allowed 
for an explicit test of whether gestalt-defined group 
mean-size bias minimized the magnitude of error with 
which individual circles were encoded. If mean-size bias 
increases VSTM efficiency, then adjustments of individual 
test circles should show lower root-mean-square errors 
(RMSE) when calculated from the mean size of the entire 
gestalt-defined group (adjusted size minus group-mean 
size) than when calculated using the actual sizes corre-
sponding to the individual test circles (adjusted size 
minus actual size).
An initial 2 (error type: adjusted size minus actual size, 
adjusted size minus group-mean size) × 4 (gestalt condi-
tion: similarity, proximity, connectedness, common 
region) × 2 (duration condition: 500 ms, 5 s) repeated 
measures within-subjects ANOVA on the two types of 
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Fig. 2. Results of the three main analyses for each combination of the gestalt and duration conditions (n = 33). The bar graphs in 
(a) show the mean error similarity (i.e., the mean correlation between adjustment errors) within the same gestalt-defined groups and 
(continued on next page)
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RMSEs for participants’ adjustments of the six circles on 
each trial revealed a significant main effect of error type, 
a significant main effect of gestalt condition, a significant 
main effect of duration condition, a significant interaction 
between error type and duration condition, and a signifi-
cant three-way interaction (all ps < .05; for the full ANOVA 
results, see Table S3a in the Supplemental Material).
The main series of planned comparisons (α = .05; p = 
.001, FDR-adjusted) was between participants’ RMSEs cal-
culated relative to the test circles’ actual sizes and RMSEs 
calculated relative to the test circles’ gestalt-defined-
group mean size. Results confirmed that RMSEs calcu-
lated relative to gestalt-defined-group mean size were 
significantly lower than RMSEs calculated relative to 
actual size for each of the eight combinations of the 
gestalt and duration conditions (Fig. 2c; for the full results 
of the eight planned comparisons, see Table S3b in the 
Supplemental Material). These findings suggest that the 
mean size of the gestalt-defined group efficiently biased 
participants’ memories of the individual circles’ sizes to 
minimize the error with which individual circles were 
encoded.
Discussion
The present results converge in support of the proposal 
that gestalt grouping facilitates perceptual averaging to 
optimize VSTM efficiency. Error similarity was greater for 
circles within the same gestalt-defined groups than for 
circles within different gestalt-defined groups. In line 
with previous findings (Brady & Alvarez, 2011), adjust-
ments of physically identical test circles were smaller for 
circles presented in the gestalt-defined small-mean-size 
sets than for circles presented in large-mean-size sets for 
the 500-ms proximity condition and the 5-s proximity, 
connectedness, and common-region conditions. Further-
more, the RMSE for adjustments relative to gestalt-
defined-group mean size was significantly lower than the 
RMSE for adjustments relative to the actual sizes of the 
individual circles for each of the eight combinations of 
the gestalt and duration conditions; this finding supports 
the proposal that mean-size bias reduced the error with 
which participants remembered the sizes of individual 
test circles. Recall that half of the circles in each gestalt-
defined mean-size set had a counterpart of the same size 
in the other set. Therefore, participants could not rely 
solely on the two different mean sizes in each display; 
instead, their memories of individual sizes were warped 
by the mean size of the corresponding gestalt-defined 
groups.
The present effects of gestalt condition and duration 
condition can be interpreted within the context of a num-
ber of previous findings. For example, consistent effects 
of proximity on participants’ error similarities and adjust-
ments of identically sized test circles at both durations 
accord with various reports of proximity’s dominant, 
even mandatory, influences (e.g., Han, 2004; Peterson & 
Berryhill, 2013; Rock & Palmer, 1990; Xu, 2006). Signifi-
cant effects of gestalt-defined-group mean size on partici-
pants’ adjustments of identically sized test circles in the 
connectedness and common-region conditions at 5 s, but 
not at 500 ms, are consistent with recent reports that 
event-related-potential indices of VSTM benefits resulting 
from grouping by connectedness (Peterson et al., 2015) 
and common region (Montoro et al., 2015) emerge dur-
ing later stages of processing. The lack of significant 
effects of gestalt-defined-group mean size in the similar-
ity condition at either duration, despite significantly cor-
related and more similar errors within the same 
similarity-defined groups relative to between different 
similarity-defined groups at both durations, echoes dis-
crepant findings regarding the influence of similarity in 
perception and VSTM. Similarity is unique in that it is not 
necessarily spatially constrained: It can involve items dis-
tributed over an entire display. Several results from 
change-detection studies have led to the proposal that 
grouping by similarity requires proximity (e.g., Jiang, 
Chun, & Olson, 2004; Peterson & Berryhill, 2013). How-
ever, other results pointing to an influence of similarity 
only during later, downstream stages of processing driven 
by top-down feedback (e.g., Han, 2004; Han, Jiang, Mao, 
Humphreys, & Gu, 2005; cf. Kubovy & van den Berg, 
between different gestalt-defined groups. The heat maps under the x-axes show the mean error similarities for each combination of 
small, medium, and large test-circle sizes (s, m, and l) both within the same gestalt-defined mean-size groups (large or small) and 
between different gestalt-defined mean-size groups. The outlines in the top left graph and heat map highlight which results are for 
the same gestalt-defined groups (solid outlines) and which are for the different gestalt-defined groups (dashed outlines). The larger 
Ss and Ls on the edge of the heat maps indicate the gestalt-defined small-mean-size group and the gestalt-defined large-mean-size 
group, respectively. The graphs in (b) show the mean adjusted size of identically sized test circles when they were presented in 
small-mean-size groups and when they were presented in large-mean-size groups. The dashed lines indicate the mean sizes of the 
small (0.85°) and large (1.25°) gestalt-defined mean-size sets. The graphs in (c) show mean root-mean-square error (RMSE) for the 
adjusted size of test circles relative to the mean size of the circles in the corresponding gestalt-defined group in the preceding display 
(adjusted size minus group mean size). They also show RMSE for the adjusted size of test circles relative to the actual sizes of the 
circles in the preceding display (adjusted size minus actual size). Asterisks indicate false-discovery-rate-adjusted significant planned 
comparisons (α = .05). Error bars indicate 95% within-subjects confidence intervals for the corresponding three-way interactions 
(Loftus & Masson, 1994).
Fig. 2. (continued)
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2008) suggest that grouping by similarity may require 
more feature and space binding and therefore more atten-
tion than other more spatially constrained heuristics. Such 
proposals are in line with findings (Brady & Alvarez, 
2011) that observers did not group items by similarity 
unless it was task relevant when they had to ignore a 
third set of items while preparing to recall the size of a 
single item that could be presented in one of two attended 
sets of three items each. Overall, the current findings pro-
vide evidence not only that gestalt grouping facilitates 
perceptual averaging, but also that the different heuristics 
tested in the present investigation may have unique, pre-
dictive effects on the manner in which information is 
economically encoded in VSTM. Future research para-
metrically varying and thresholding the different strengths 
of gestalt grouping cues can help to uncover their char-
acteristic effects on the manner in which information is 
encoded and recalled.
The present results cannot be explained by fixed-
capacity models that assume objects are encoded inde-
pendently in VSTM (e.g., Bays & Husain, 2008; Cowan, 
2001; Pashler, 1988); models in which the statistical struc-
ture of information is exploited are more likely to be 
accurate. For example, the present findings extend pro-
posals that the visual system uses statistical regularities to 
compress covariant information into more efficient 
chunks (e.g., Brady, Konkle, & Alvarez, 2009) by suggest-
ing gestalt-grouping principles as a plausible basis for 
what constitutes a chunk. The current results can also be 
interpreted within the context of (a) probabilistic hierar-
chical-encoding models in which noisy samples of indi-
vidual objects are remembered as a function of the 
observer’s expectations about other items sharing the 
same properties (e.g., Brady & Alvarez, 2011) and (b) 
models that account for the statistical dependencies 
between individual objects by inferring probability distri-
butions over different clusters of information (e.g., Brady 
& Alvarez, 2011; Brady & Tenenbaum, 2013; Orhan & 
Jacobs, 2013) to allow for the representation of visual 
information at multiple scales simultaneously. It has 
repeatedly been suggested that statistical descriptions of 
sets of similar items taken with a small set of explicit 
object files may underlie humans’ remarkable perceptual 
abilities despite the visual system’s limited capacity (e.g., 
Treisman, 2006). This suggestion is in line with findings 
(e.g., Hyde & Wood, 2011) that attention may be a key 
factor in determining whether information is encoded in 
individual object files (Kahneman & Treisman, 1984) or 
global statistical approximations.
The present study is the first to report effects of simi-
larity, proximity, connectedness, and common region on 
memory representations within the same experiment, 
using the same paradigm. In addition to extending 
proposals that gestalt grouping reduces the amount of 
resources needed to represent information to a wider 
range of heuristics, the present results point to a plausi-
ble source for this reduction: Grouping facilitates percep-
tual averaging as part of a broader strategy that the visual 
system relies on to minimize the variance in memory rep-
resentations for efficient, pragmatic encoding of redun-
dant information. Building on the proposal from Im and 
Chong (2014) that mean size is a unit of VSTM, the pres-
ent results suggest that mean size is an emergent prop-
erty of gestalt grouping, such that individual item 
properties are represented as functions of the statistical 
properties of the entire set. This representational warping 
allows observers to remember more information about 
multiple objects, such that “the properties of the parts are 
determined by the intrinsic structural laws of the whole” 
(Wertheimer, 1925/1938, p. 7).
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Notes
1. Note that although the colors of the study and test circles 
were chosen to minimize interference from afterimages, after-
images were unlikely to persist over the several seconds that 
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observers required to adjust all six test circles in each display. 
Furthermore, the positions of the test circles in each group were 
randomized on every trial.
2. Note that only one gestalt grouping principle was used 
on each trial. Consequently, the terms “same gestalt-defined 
groups” and “different gestalt-defined groups” are used to 
refer to membership in the two groups formed by that single 
gestalt principle and not to refer to the same or different gestalt 
conditions (similarity, proximity, connectedness, and common 
region).
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